I. Introduction
It is increasingly recognized that human welfare is affected by the insecurity brought up by war, civil strife, and crime (e.g. Clinard and Abbott, 1973; Bourguignon, 2000) . Direct effects arise from victimization and the fear it instills in neighbors, relatives, and members of the community at large.
Indirect effects come from reduced investment and incomes and from diminished provision of --and access to --public services. This paper examines the indirect effect of crime-driven insecurity on incomes and public services.
We test whether insecurity is associated with a reduction in various welfare indicators. Attempts to investigate this relationship are typically hindered by the need to control for unobserved heterogeneity. We overcome this difficulty by using what amounts to location-specific fixed effects. Other empirical investigations of insecurity and welfare have relied primarily on crosscountry comparisons (e.g. Soares, 2004; Loayza, 2002a, 2002b; Gaviria and Pages, 2001) , with all the difficulties inherent to this kind of research --e.g., different data sources, time period, cultures, etc. Here we use data coming from a single country that were collected at the same time using the same questionnaire. The data covers the whole country.
Results show that an increase in insecurity is associated with a significant reduction in incomes and in access to health centers and schools. The effect is robust to the inclusion of various controls, and the use of alternative methods such as propensity score matching or instrumental variable regression. We also investigate possible channels through which insecurity may affect welfare. We find that a rise in insecurity in a given location is associated with a reduction in the likelihood that a new school or health center is built there. We also provide evidence that insecurity is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of attracting a development project. Results further indicate that certain types of economic activity such as large-scale manufacturing are more sensitive to changes in insecurity than others, like small-scale mining.
These findings are by themselves not surprising. What is surprising is that they are so strong in a country that is not known for drug trade or guerilla activity. In spite of attracting many tourists and sizeable foreign investment, the studied country suffers from what could be called pervasive low-F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y level insecurity. Much of it is related to property crime and the ineffectiveness of the police and prison system (e.g. Ministère de la Justice, 1999; Fafchamps and Moser, 2003) . This study shows that crime and the feelings of insecurity it generates seem to have large welfare effects through economic activity and the provision of public services.
Since Becker's (1968) initial foray, an economic literature on crime has emerged and is now well established in developed countries. Much of this work has focused on the issues of deterrence (e.g. Ehrlich and Brower, 1987; Ehrlich, 1996; Levitt, 1996 Levitt, , 1997 Levitt, , 1998 Farmer and Terrell, 2001 ) and the determinants of criminal behavior (e.g. Ehrlich, 1975; Blau and Blau, 1982; Sah, 1991; Ludwig, Duncan and Hirschfield, 2001; Morgan, 2000; Freeman, 1996; Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001; DiIulio, 1996) . Some work has also been done on the cost of crime prevention to individuals and on the effect that crime has on investment and the choice of residence (e.g. Cullen and Levitt, 1999; Freeman, Grogger and Sonstelie, 1996; Helsley and Strange, 1999) .
More recently, the literature has turned to the study of crime in poor and middle-income countries.
In a series of articles relying on cross-country comparisons, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza show that crime-related insecurity hurts growth (e.g. Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 1998 , 2002a , 2002b Lederman, Loayza and Menendez, 2000) . There is also a growing body of work based on micro data. Pradhan and Ravallion (1999) , for instance, show that insecurity ranks high on the welfare priorities of Tanzanian dwellers. Demombynes and Ozler (2002) examine crime in South Africa and show that high crime rates in poor districts spill over to richer neighborhoods. Using data from Madagascar, Fafchamps and Moser (2003) show that the incidence of certain categories of crime is higher in isolated areas than in urban centers, thereby reversing the general perception that crime is primarily an urban phenomenon. The authors also show that police deterrence is ineffective in Madagascar. Fafchamps and Minten (2006) further show that an exogenous increase in poverty is associated with a rise in crop theft.
This literature has recently been joined by economic work on conflicts. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Collier and Hoeffler (2002) have shown that many violent political conflicts follow an economic rationale, particularly the capture of a valuable income source such as a diamond mine.
Using cross-country evidence, Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2004) show that once initiated, F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y violent political conflict tends to persist. The relationship between crime and conflicts is examined by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who provide evidence that conflicts fuel crime but not the reverse.
Using panel household data from Uganda which has been plagued by civil war for a decade or more, Deininger (2003) shows that civil strife reduces welfare, but crime does not. In contrast to the existing literature, this paper empirically tests the association between welfare and insecurity and investigates the channels through which these effects are likely to take place.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly present the conceptual framework and testing strategy. Section 3 discusses the data and presents summary statistics. In Section 4 we test whether insecurity reduces welfare. Section 5 examines a number of channels through which insecurity affects welfare. Conclusions and suggestions for further research are presented at the end.
II. Conceptual Framework
Following Becker (1968) , it is now customary to recognize that crime responds to economic incentives. Crime is also widely believed to affect economic incentives, although the magnitude of this effect is unclear. Other sources of insecurity, such as riots, civil wars and political conflict, are similarly thought to influence economic outcomes.
To investigate the relationship between insecurity and welfare, we estimate regressions of the form:
W it = αS it + βC it + µ i + ε it (1) where W it is a welfare indicator for location i at time t, S it is a measure of insecurity, C it i s a vector of controls, µ i is a fixed effect, and ε it is an error term. The fixed effect captures any locationspecific time-invariant factor that may affect welfare. Controlling for such effects is essential because many location-specific features such as isolation or population density may influence welfare as well as insecurity. Failing to control for these factors may generate a spurious correlation between welfare and insecurity.
Differencing (1) to eliminate the fixed effect, we obtain a regression model of the form: where the notation ∆x it ≡ x it -x it-1 . Equation (2) regresses changes in welfare on changes in insecurity, controlling for various other effects so as to minimize omitted variable bias. Estimating (2) for various welfare indicators is the first purpose of our econometric analysis.
We also wish to investigate the channels through which insecurity may affect welfare. To do so, we examine whether insecurity is associated with a number of potential channels N it which are generally regarded as strongly related with specific dimensions of welfare. For instance, health is affected by the presence or absence of health facilities. We can therefore test whether an increase in insecurity is associated with a lower likelihood of creation of a health facility in a given location, i.e., whether:
Here as before, differentiating eliminates time-invariant fixed effects that may be correlated with insecurity as well as with the presence of a health facility.
III. The Data
The purpose of the rest of this paper is to estimate equations (2) and (3) using comprehensive survey data on Madagascar. Madagascar constitutes a perfect test case for an investigation of insecurity and welfare. The country is quite poor, with a GDP per head of US$260 in 2002 (World Bank, 2003 . The Malagasy government estimates that 69% of the population are below the poverty line (e.g. GOM, 2003; Mistiaen, Ozler, Razafimanantena and Razafindravonona, 2002 ). The country is also known to have a high crime rate (Fafchamps andMoser, 2003) .
A map of Madagascar with provincial and communal boundaries is shown in Figure 1 . Population density is depicted in shades of grey. With a population of 16 million and a size equivalent to that of France, Belgium, and Holland combined, Madagascar has a low population density --the median population density in each commune is 26 inhabitants per square Km. We see that population is densest in the Central highlands around the main cities of Antananarivo (the capital city) and Antsirabe. The Eastern highlands and coast between Toamasina and Fianarantsoa are also heavily F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y populated. This largely reflects climate patterns that make these areas more productive for agriculture. Other major cities such as Toamasina, Mahajanga, Toliara, and Antsiranana are coastal port cities with a small rural hinterland surrounding them. The Western and Southwestern parts of the country are more arid and much less populated.
Although Madagascar has not experienced any major armed conflict since independence, iv insecurity is known to be a major problem. Fafchamps and Moser (2003) provide evidence that the homicide rates are comparable to that of the US in the early 1990s, when they were at its highest.
Cattle rustling is a major problem in low population density area, with extremely high rates of cattle theft and the involvement of organized crime (e.g. Rasamoelina, 2000; Razafitsiamidy, 1997) . Crop theft is also a commonly cited problem, and Fafchamps and Minten (2006) show an exogenous increase in poverty to be associated with a rise in crop theft.
Insecurity appears to be related to insufficient law enforcement. Ministère de la Justice (1999) and Root (1993) provide ample evidence that the legal system is not running effectively. Fafchamps and Moser (2003) show that law enforcement has no deterrent effect on crime. Survey responses suggest that, in some parts of the country, criminals who are caught do not spend any time in jail because of inefficient courts and lax prison rules. In these circumstances, we would expect insecurity to have a measurable impact on welfare.
The data on which we base our empirical analysis comes from a survey conducted by the authors in 2001. Our unit of analysis is the commune, a geographically defined administrative unit roughly equivalent to a municipality or county. Madagascar has six provinces (or faritany), which are The crime statistics and other data used in this paper were all collected as part of the commune survey. The survey was conducted over a three-month period in 2001 in collaboration between Cornell University, Oxford University, and the Malagasy agricultural research institute (FOFIFA). A total of 1385 communes were surveyed, all but 9 currently functioning communes.
vi The remoteness of some communes and the general lack of national data on certain subjects meant that little was known about the spatial distribution of public goods and services, economic activity, or insecurity prior to the survey.
The survey was conducted at the commune's administrative center. Enumerators were instructed to gather a number of statistics from the relevant government offices in the commune. More subjective questions, such as those concerning community perceptions of existing conditions, were answered by a focus group composed of a small group of prominent residents of the commune --typically municipality officials and key informants. Crime statistics were collected only for 1999, 2000 and 2001 so as to minimize recall bias. To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist systematic time series crime data on all the municipalities of the country.
Descriptive statistics on insecurity and welfare are presented in Table 1 . Focus group respondents were asked whether insecurity improved or worsened in their commune over the five years period preceding the survey. Their subjective assessment is reported in the first column of Table 1 . We see that 30% of respondents estimate that the level of insecurity in their commune improved between 1996 and 2001 while 51% estimate that it worsened. Only 19% responded that it remained unchanged.
Focus group respondents were also asked whether average income in the commune increased or fell over the same period. Responses are summarized in column 2 of To investigate this, we compare subjective perception of insecurity to crime incidence figures.
Respondents were asked to rank the security situation in their commune. Responses, presented in Table 2 , show that 28% of respondents find the security situation either bad or very bad while 25% find it good or very good. The others find it average. Recognized high crime areas have been flagged as a 'red zone' by the government; 30% of the country's communes are counted as part of the 'red zone'. Table 2 also presents stated development priorities of commune respondents.
Insecurity comes third in this ranking, being the top development priority for 15% of the communes, and second priority for another 13% of communes. Insecurity is especially a concern in remote communes, a result in line with the work of Fafchamps and Moser (2003) . Since remote communes also tend to be larger, when we weigh responses by area we find that insecurity is the first or second development priority in communes representing 43% of the country's area.
It is of interest to examine whether subjective assessments of insecurity are related to actual insecurity. Given the absence of civil unrest during the period under investigation, crime must the primary source of insecurity. In the second panel of Table 2 we report crime statistics collected in the commune survey. These statistics were collected separately for 1999, 2000 and 2001. Here they are averaged over the three year period 1999-2001 and reported per 100,000 inhabitants.
Of the five types of criminal activity recorded in the commune survey, cattle rustling is the most common. An average of 80 or so head of cattle are stolen on average each year in each commune --an average of 1500 or so head of cattle per 100,000 inhabitants. This figure is influenced by a number of a small number of very large outliers where cattle rustling takes place at an `industrial' level. But the median is still 62 head of cattle reported stolen each year per 100,000 inhabitants. vii Burglaries are the next most common type of crime, with some 43 burglaries on average per year per 100,000 inhabitants. The average number of reported homicides is higher than the high US national average from the early 1990's: 8.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (Fox and Zawitz, 2000) . This number is a bit higher than the 1994 national average of 6.4 intentional homicides reported in Fajnzylber et al. (1998) . The median number of homicides is much lower, suggesting that crime is concentrated in certain communes. As shown by Fafchamps and Moser (2003) highest homicide rates are found in isolated, less densely populated areas. The incidence of rape appears low, with less than three reported cases on average per 100,000 inhabitants. This is likely due to under-reporting bias. Vehicle theft is extremely rare, reflecting the low number of personal vehicles on the island and the fact that few people know how to drive.
To ascertain the validity of the subjective assessment of the security situation by survey respondents, we would like to regress this ranking on crime statistics. Before we do so, however, we worry that the responses given in the commune survey may be influenced in a systematic manner by the composition of the focus group. It is conceivable, for instance, that members of specific professions may be more sensitive to crime and tend to over-report it. To the extent that the composition of the focus group is correlated with location and crime, this may result in a spurious relationship. At the bottom of Table 2 we present the information we have regarding the composition of focus groups. The average number of participants is close to 9 people. Communal employees and social service workers represent over 60% of the respondents. This is unsurprising since they are likely to be the best source of quantitative information about communal affairs.
There is also a non-negligible proportion of farmers and this proportion varies from focus group to focus group. Table 3 reports an ordered probit regression of the subjective insecurity ranking on the five crime rate variables and the red zone dummy. Focus group variables are included to control, to the extent possible, for response bias. Results demonstrate that insecurity as perceived by focus group respondents largely reflects actual crime: the red zone dummy and three of the five crime variables are significant --often at the 1% level.
viii Car theft is not significant, most probably because it is very rare. From these observations we conclude that the subjective assessment of insecurity reported by respondents is closely related with objective risk measures; it is not just driven by irrational fear and prejudice.
These results are consistent with earlier studies which have shown that, in Madagascar, perceived insecurity is significantly related to the prevalence of crime which, in the studied country, increases with isolation (Fafchamps and Moser, 2003) and poverty (Fafchamps and Minten, 2006 Table 3 : cattle theft has a strong effect on feelings of insecurity, either directly (the coefficient of cattle theft has a t-value close to 8) or indirectly through the `zone rouge' (high crime) dummy, which is exclusively rural and concentrated in high cattle theft areas. Anthropological studies of cattle theft in Madagascar document the role of organized roaming gangs that steal cattle from one commune and walk it over long distances to sell it elsewhere. Similar observations have been made for Northern Kenya by McPeak and Barrett (2001) .
IV. Insecurity and Welfare
We now examine the relationship between perceived insecurity and the four welfare measures collected in the survey --income, access to health care, access to schooling, and infant mortality.
Since all five measures compare the situation prevailing at the time of the survey with that prevailing five years earlier, they are already in differenced form, i.e., as they appear in equation
Ordered probit regression results are presented in Table 4 . Focus group composition variables are included as controls for possible response bias. Results show a strong negative association between an increase in insecurity over the period 1996-2001 and an improvement in income, health status, and school enrollment. Put differently, communes that experienced an increase in insecurity experienced a significantly lower increase in income, health status, or school enrollment. Infant mortality increases with insecurity but the effect is not statistically significant. These results suggest that insecurity is significantly and negatively associated with several dimensions of welfare.
The question that immediately follows is through what channel(s) this relationship occurs. Before we turn to this question, however, we must verify that the results shown in Table 4 are robust. The first possibility we investigate is the idea that both insecurity and welfare were affected by some other factor, resulting in a spurious relationship. For instance, it is conceivable that communes affected by a cyclone or a drought experienced a fall in income and a rise in insecurity, as shown Miguel (2003) . To reduce the chance of such omitted variable bias, we include as additional regressors a number of variables capturing a wide variety of shocks. This approach does not entirely eliminate the risk of omitted variable bias, but it is the best we can do with the data at hand.
Shock variables are described in Table 5 . Each variable measures the number of years, over the three years preceding the survey, during which a given shock or disease affected the commune.
Each variable takes values from 0 (no year) to 3 (in all three years). As evidenced by Table 5 , the list of shock variables is quite long as it includes climatic events (cyclone, drought, flood), plant pests and diseases (locusts, rice fleas), human diseases, and livestock diseases. Bad climatic events are a frequent occurrence, the late start of the rains being the most often cited shock. Cyclones hit the East coast of the country every year, devastating crops, causing floods, and cutting roads. Some human diseases, malaria for instance, are endemic in most of the country so there is very little variation from year to year. Others such as plague vary over time.
An additional source of concern is the possibility that disgruntled or pessimistic focus groups may respond to all questions in a negative manner. This would generate a response bias that would be common to the insecurity variable and the variables measuring changes in welfare over time. The analysis presented in Table 2 suggests that subjective perceptions about the level of insecurity correlate well with objective measures of crime, but here we are concerned about subjective perceptions about changes in insecurity. Unfortunately commune-level crime statistics going back to 1996 and before do not exist for Madagascar. Consequently we cannot conduct the same analysis as we did in Table 2 by regressing perceptions about changes in insecurity on changes in reported crime between 1996 and 2001.
We seek to address this concern by constructing two proxies for `gripe'. Including these proxies as additional controls should reduce the omitted variable bias. We also construct our first proxy for gripe using the residual from the regression presented in Table 3 . For memory, in that regression we regress the level of insecurity --as reported by the focus group at the time of the survey --on recent crime statistics. The error term from this regression can be taken as a proxy for the focus group's tendency to over-report insecurity. The second proxy we construct uses answers to focus group questions that are not directly related to welfare or insecurity but are likely to be correlated with 'gripe'. More specifically, we use answers to questions on late rains and total rainfall over the three years preceding the survey, as reported by the focus group. We combine answers to construct an index of how much the respondents complained about bad rains. We then regress this index on the value of the same index averaged over neighboring communes. The idea is that rainfall in communes nearby should be correlated with own rainfall but not with the pessimistic temperament of the respondents. Results are shown in Appendix, Table A1 . The regression is highly significant, with an R 2 of 0.24. The residual from this regression measures how much more than neighboring communes the respondents complained about rainfall. This residual is a proxy for gripe if we are willing to assume that rainfall is spatially correlated --so that rainfall in neighboring communes is a good predictor --and that gripe is distributed more or less independently across communes. While there is little doubt about the first assumption, we unfortunately have no way of verifying the second. The validity of the procedure therefore rests on this maintained assumption. Table 6 presents ordered probit regressions of changes in welfare indicators on changes in insecurity, the composition of the focus group, the two proxies for 'gripe', and the various shock and disease variables listed in Table 5 . ix We see that the insecurity coefficients retain the same sign and magnitude in all four regressions. They remain significantly negative in the first two regressions, but they are not significant in the other two. Except for one coefficient which is significant at the 10% level, the gripe variables are not significant.
Although shock and disease variables are used here only as controls, it is instructive to check whether they have the anticipated effect. We find that many climatic shocks are associated with a fall in welfare. For instance, floods, droughts, and late rains all tend to reduce income. Typhoid is associated with a fall in health status and school enrollment. Other results are more puzzling, such as the positive association between other livestock diseases and improvement in two of our welfare indicators. In this case, it is possible that higher prosperity leads households to buy, sell, and keep more livestock, thereby creating conditions favorable to epidemics. The positive association It is conceivable that recent shocks loom larger in respondents' assessment of improvements in welfare. To investigate this possibility, we reestimate Table 6 using only shocks reported to 2001.
Results, not shown here to save space, are basically identical to those reported in Table 6 . We also worry that, given the high frequency of many reported shocks, they approximate average incidence rather than shock. To correct for this possibility, we regress shock measures on a large number of commune physical characteristics, such as latitude, longitude, elevation, average rainfall, and the like. The residuals from these regressions represent variation in shock variables that cannot be attributed to time-invariant characteristics. We then obtain the residuals from these regressions and use them as proxies for unanticipated shocks in Table 6 . Results, not shown here to save space, yield a stronger estimated effect of the insecurity variable, which is significant not only in the income and health status regressions but also in the infant mortality regression.
As emphasized in the literature on treatment effects (e.g. Lee, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002) , the results in To fit our analysis into this framework, let us define as treated those communes that suffered an increase in insecurity; those that did not are controls. Roughly half of the communes fall in each category. We report in Table 7 the results obtained using two different matching techniques. This metric is referred to as the Mahalanobis metric. We implement this method using all the controls appearing in Table 6 as part of the covariate vector x.
The second set of results reported in Table 7 is based on propensity score matching. In this method, we begin by regressing treatment on the controls, the results of which are shown in Table A2 in appendix.
x The predicted probability of treatment generated by this regression is called the propensity score. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that, as long as there is no selection on unobservables, the effect of the treatment can be consistently measured by comparing treated and untreated communes with similar propensity scores.
Estimates of the average treatment effect for our four welfare variables of interest are presented in Table 7 , using common support. For propensity score matching, we use the radius method with a caliper of 0.1 as this yields the most stable results. For comparison purpose we also report results for the unmatched. Results are very similar to those reported in Table 6 : both matching estimators yield a significant difference between treated and control for average income and health status, but no significant effect infant mortality and school enrollment. This confirms that the results reported in Table 6 are not an artifact of the regression framework.
There remains the possibility that the gripe variables do not fully control for response bias. The resulting measurement error in the insecurity variable may lead to endogeneity bias. In an attempt to correct for this source of bias, we seek to instrument the insecurity variable. To do this, we need to find an instrument for the change in insecurity over the years preceding the survey. We use the population census of 1993 to construct two variables that are likely to affect subsequent changes in crime but could not have been caused by it. In Madagascar, the presence of young men in the village is likely to improve the security situation. This is because rural insecurity is often due to gangs that attack villages to steal cattle, a point that has been emphasized repeatedly in the anthropological literature (e.g. Rasamoelina, 2000; Razafitsiamidy, 1997) and in regression analysis of crime in Madagascar (Fafchamps and Moser, 2003) . Young males make communities less vulnerable to such attacks and may serve as a deterrent.
xi
To capture this idea, we construct a variable that measures the growth in the proportion of teenage males in the commune population. The 1993 population census report age in 5-year categories.
Males aged 10 to 14 in 1993 will be between 13 and 17 in 1996 and between 18 and 22 in 2001.
These are the teenage males in the recall period covered by the commune survey. Let their proportion in the population be written S 10-14 . In contrast, males aged 15 to 19 in 1993 were teenagers at the time of the census but have basically become adults by the time of our recall period. Let their proportion in the population be written S [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . The regressor is ∆S = S 10-14 -S [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] ; if it is positive, there are more teenage males during the survey recall period relative to the preceding 5 year period --and vice versa if it negative. If the presence of teenage males deters thieves, the variable should have a negative effect on insecurity: more teenage males relative to the preceding period reduces insecurity. To allow for spillover effects across communes, we use ∆S in neighboring communes as additional regressor in the propensity score regression. While this identification strategy is not ideal --i.e., it does not rely on a controlled or quasi experimental source of variation in insecurity --it should satisfy the exclusion restriction and it is the best we can do with the available data.
The instrumenting regression, shown in Table A3 in appendix, is basically the same as Table A2 except that it includes two more variables and is estimated using least squares. As expected, a higher proportion of young males is associated with a smaller increase in insecurity. The population variables are jointly significant but the value of the joint F-test is below 10, suggesting that we have a weak instrument problem.
Regression results with instrumented insecurity are shown in Table 8 . Overidentification tests of the validity of the instruments fail to reject the null hypothesis that instruments are uncorrelated with the errors in the main regression. Since we have weak instruments we apply the AndersonRubin test as implemented by Moreira (2001) . This procedure corrects the threshold value for the Table 8 .
Results show a massive increase in the magnitude of the insecurity coefficient (6.5 to 25 times larger). This is consistent with the presence of measurement error, uninstrumented results suffering from attenuation bias. This is hardly surprising given that subjective rankings are known to vary with mood, time of the day, and other psychological and physiological factors (e.g. Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Diener, Suh, Lucas and Smith, 1999; Layard, 2002) . After instrumentation, the insecurity variable is significant with the anticipated sign in the income, health status, and infant mortality regressions. These results accord serve as an additional confirmation that the association between changes in welfare and insecurity is not simply a consequence of response bias.
V. Possible Channels
Having documented a robust relationship between insecurity and certain dimensions of welfare, we briefly examine possible channels through which this relationship may take place. We begin by reporting the opinion of the respondents. Each focus group was asked to provide the main cause for the change in each of the four welfare indicators. Their responses, broken into categories, are summarized in Table 9 .
The most often cited cause for variation in income is a change in agricultural prices. xii Insecurity is listed as the main reason for change in income by 8% of the communes. This is a fairly remarkable result since a change in insecurity must be quite severe before being given as the main reason for changes in income in the commune as a whole. The provision of a new health center and of a new school is given as the most important reasons for changes in health status and school enrollment, respectively. Health facilities also loom large in responses regarding infant mortality.
Contrary to income, insecurity is not often listed for health status, school attendance, and infant mortality. This may be misleading, however, because insecurity may hinder or delay the construction of new schools and health centers in affected communities. To investigate this issue more in detail, we test whether an increase in insecurity is associated with a lower probability of attracting public services into the commune. We have information on when various infrastructures and services were first established in the studied communes. This information is summarized in Table 10 which shows the proportion of communes with the infrastructure or service in 1996 and 2001. We see that the study period witnessed a fairly large increase in the provision of secondary schools, basic health centers, and drinking water. The increase in agricultural input and output markets was less pronounced.
Based on the information presented in the first panel of Table 10 , we create dummy variable that are not our focus of interest, we need not discuss them any further. As before, we include gripe proxies in the welfare regressions and we control for the composition of focus groups.
Regression results shown in Table 11 indicate that an increase in insecurity is associated with a lower likelihood that a secondary school or health center is built. Other public infrastructures such as drinking water and agricultural markets appear unaffected. The tentative conclusion we can draw from this and the earlier evidence is that insecurity affects welfare at least partly through lower provision of certain public services. It is worth noting that the two public services affected by insecurity, secondary schools and health centers, both require that an educated workforce (teachers, This contrast suggests that one factor that hinders the delivery of public services to insecure areas is the difficulty to convince teachers and health workers to work and reside there.
We also have information on the number of new development projects taking place in the commune over the 1996-2001 period. As shown in Table 10 , during this period the average number of new development projects per commune was 2.23 with a median of 2. Only 19% of communes did not have a new development project during the period. We regress the (log of the) number of new development projects (+1) on the change in insecurity. Results, presented in Table 12 , again show a negative relationship: communes that experienced a deterioration of the security situation received fewer new development projects. The magnitude of the effect is non negligible: if the security situation worsened a bit instead of staying the same, this results in a 6% fall in the number of projects undertaken in the commune. Going from 'worsened a lot' to 'improved a lot' results in a 25% increase in the number of development projects. Given that development projects typically aim at increasing incomes and improving welfare, this evidence suggests that insecurity also lowers welfare by discouraging the placement of development projects in affected areas.
We conduct a similar analysis on manufacturing and mining employment. Results --not shown here to save space --show a significant negative effect of an increase in insecurity on employment growth in large manufacturing firms (more than 50 employees), but no effect on mining employment and on smaller manufacturers. To the extent that large firms depend more on sophisticated equipment and educated manpower, this again suggests that insecurity is less harmful to traditional, informal income generating activities than it is to economic activity of a more modern nature.
The survey also provides some evidence that insecurity has a negative effect on agriculture.
Respondents were asked what factors hinder the expansion of cultivated acreage in lowland (irrigated) and upland (non-irrigated) areas. Insecurity was cited by 10% of respondents for lowland Based on the work of Fafchamps and Minten (2006) , Rasamoelina (2000) , and Razafitsiamidy (1997), the fear of crop theft and of encounters with cattle thieves may be the dominant concerns of villagers. This provides yet another channel by which insecurity affects welfare: the fear of venturing too far from the village appears to discourage many farmers from expanding cultivated acreage and hence output.
VI. Conclusion
Using original data collected by the authors, this paper has examined the relationship between insecurity and welfare. Identification of this relationship is not based on a controlled or natural experiment, so causal inference is potentially problematic and results should be interpreted in this light. We do, however, control for commune fixed effects -arguably the main cause for concern in analyses of this type. We also do our best to check the robustness of our results with respect to potential sources of bias, in particular omitted variable bias and response bias.
The results show that an increase in insecurity, as perceived by respondents, is associated with lower incomes, school enrollment, and health status, and with a higher infant mortality. This association is consistently significant for incomes and health status. For school enrollment and infant mortality, it is only significant for some estimators. Results are robust to the inclusion of shocks potentially affecting both welfare and insecurity. These findings are in contrast to those of
Deininger (2003) who found no effect of crime on rural incomes in Uganda.
We then turned to the channels through which insecurity may affect welfare. We find a significant relationship between an increase in insecurity and improvements in the provision of certain public services, notably schooling and health care. We find a similar relationship with the placement of development projects. We also find some evidence that insecurity is associated with an employment reduction in large manufacturing firms -but not in mining --and that it discourages farmers from expanding cultivated acreage. Taken together, the evidence suggests that insecurity is probably an important determinant of welfare in the country studied. Insecurity seems to affect welfare in many ways: through incomes via its effect on economic activity and development projects; and through access to public services by hindering the placement of social infrastructures in insecure areas. Certain types of public services --schools and health centers --and certain types of economic activity --e.g., large-scale manufacturing --appear more sensitive to insecurity than others such as mining and agricultural trade.
These findings raise the issue of why insecurity is so pervasive in Madagascar. The lax attitude of police, courts, and jail institutions appears largely responsible for this state of affairs (e.g. Root, 1993; World Bank, 1995) . Fafchamps and Moser (2003) , for instance, show that police presence has no deterrent effect on crime in Madagascar. Based on a survey of legal institutions in the country, the Ministère de la Justice (1999) documents many shortcomings in the implementation of existing laws. In particular, it is common for convicted criminals to be allowed out of jail in exchange for money. As a result, only petty criminals who cannot afford to pay remain in prison.
To further investigate this possibility, a question on jail effectiveness was asked to focus group respondents in a follow-up survey. xv Respondents were asked whether, if a major cattle thief were found in the commune, he would be sent to prison and would stay there. Responses, summarized in Table 13 , show a sharp contrast between provinces. While the majority of respondents living in the Central highlands (Antananarivo and Fianarantsoa) believe that the thief would be sent to jail, respondents in other parts of the country --most notably Antsiranana -overwhelmingly believe the thief would either not be convicted or, if convicted, would not serve his sentence.
These findings suggest that a major effort is long overdue to restructure and discipline the police and especially the prison institutions in Madagascar. The main focus should be organized crime, particularly cattle rustling. The evidence presented here indeed suggests that the insecurity generated by crime, especially in remote rural areas, discourages economic activity and makes it difficult to provide essential public services such as health care and schooling. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Number of valid observations 1378 Each variable measures the number of years the commune was affected by a shock or disease in the three years preceding the survey. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y Minten@cgiar.org iv After a disputed presidential election, the country was temporarily divided into two in early 2002, each faction occupying part of the island. After a blockade of the Central Highlands that lasted several months, the stand-off was eventually resolved when the incumbent president fled the country in June 2002. In spite of the severity of the political crisis, the level of political violence was kept surprisingly low, with estimates of crisis-related casualties numbering less than 100 victims. v The exact number remains unclear due to the existence of conflicting "official" lists. This confusion is the result of changes in the boundaries and composition of some communes in the mid-1990s. vi Nine communes were missed in the survey, either because they are too isolated or too insecure or both. The number of missing communes is very small so selection bias is unlikely to be an issue in the estimation. vii The high incidence of cattle rustling may be related to traditional practices of certain ethnic groups. The Bara, one of the dominant ethnic groups in Southwestern Madagascar, are known cattle thieves because young men are supposed to prove their manhood by stealing cattle. When they have done so, they are ready to get married (Ramiarantsoa, 1995) . The Sakalava have similar customs. Cattle rustling is more common in the western part of the island. This largely reflects the fact that this drier part of the island is most suitable for extensive livestock production, which naturally facilitates livestock theft (Smith, Barrett and Box, 2001 ). viii It is conceivable that the feeling of insecurity responds more strongly to recent events. To investigate this possibility, we reestimate the model using only crime reported in the year preceding the survey (2001) and only crime reported in 1999. We obtain slightly stronger results (higher tvalues) using 2001 crime data or the 1999-2001 average than using the 1999 numbers. But the results are otherwise quite similar. ix We omit malaria and two animal diseases --distomatosis and Newcastle disease --because they are endemic in the entire country and have too little variation for their coefficient to be identified. Including them does not change the conclusions regarding insecurity, however. x The regression by and large satisfies the balancing property. Balancedness is violated at the 5% level in two cases (out of a total of 24 variables times 7 blocks) involving two different variables in two different blocks, without any evidence of a pattern. xi It is also conceivable that the presence of young males coming of age during the period covered by our analysis had an worsening effect on crime and insecurity because crime (especially violent (Wilson, Daly and Pound, 2002) . We would expect this pattern in societies where crime is perpetrated by nearby residents, but it is unlikely to apply to rural Madagascar where cattle rustling by itinerant gangs is the major security concern. xii Unfortunately, we do not have longitudinal information on agricultural prices at the commune level and cannot therefore test whether communes that became more insecure experienced a fall in agricultural prices. xiii For lowland cultivation, 3% of communes cited insecurity as the first reason for not expanding acreage; another 7% cited it as second reason. For upland cultivation, insecurity was cited as first and second reason by 8% and 15% of communes, respectively. xiv It is not contended that service provision helps welfare. It is thus not really necessary for us to demonstrate that a link exists in our data as well. The reader may nevertheless like to know that when change in public provision is added to Table 8 , results conform with expectations --adding a school raises school enrollment, adding agricultural input and output markets raises incomes, and adding a health center tends to raise health status and reduce infant mortality. The latter effect, however, is only significant at the 15 to 20% level. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
